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ABSTRACT 
Since the beginnings of modern microfinance in the 70s, the industry continued  to grow 
rapidly, albeit fueled by dubious assumptions related to market potential. Boosted by Nobel Prize 
award, thousands of new MFIs are currently being created in the lure of market potential, estimated at 
one and half billion of unattended clients. The estimates, however, differ drastically and there is no 
wide scale assessment available deducing the unattainable market strata, detrimental to sustainable 
microfinance, from the inflated estimates. The exaggerations are to be denoted as unrealistic and 
excluded from the global estimates. This study intends to quantify the market wrongly assumed to 
form part of the microfinance market and to deduce the real size of the potential global microfinance 
sector, appraising the size of the market that should not be counted into the integral demand, since it is 
unsustainable or harmful to the players involved.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION  
 
So far no general consensus exists on how big is the potential microfinance market. 
Many authors point out that microfinance, defined as financial services that is provided to 
unemployed or low-income individuals or groups without access to these, is not for everyone 
and may be inappropriate especially where certain pre-conditions are absent. However, most 
market estimates uncritically count with a great part or all the “unbanked” adults in 
developing countries as potential microfinance customers and arrive at undue market 
estimates. Evidence raises a concern that demand may often be overestimated by a 
considerable margin (Anand and Rosenberg, CGAP, 2008). Lack of sober evaluations of the 
real size of the market may have detrimental impact on the clientele as microfinance 
providers, motivated by unrealistic expectations, are fuelling more capital into the sector than 
necessary.  
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Flaming proclamations of private and governmental microfinance programs advocating 
the global importance of microfinance should sober down and restrict their focus only on 
those poor able to initiate activities with growth potential, forming real, attainable and 
sustainable markets (Parker and Pearce, CGAP, 2002). As shown in this study, the 
realisticsize of the global microfinance market may be of a smaller size than the numbers 
often cited in publications and repeated in conferences. The reasons why only reduced part of 
the population should be considered target market, are varied. The study has focused on loan 
and savings, although microfinance encompasses other products. Credit and savings however 
stay the core of microfinance services, being the key components, while other products such 
as microinsurance protecting the borrowers liabilities, serve complementary functions. In the 
long run, sustainable MFIs center their activity around savers and borrowers. 
Only a fraction of the population is interested in savings or can qualify for  
microfinance services. According to CGAP, for microcredit to be appropriate, a pre-existing 
level of ongoing economic activity is needed (Ibid.). Morduch and Haley (2002) acknowledge 
the entrepreneurial skills as crucial as not all people are equally able to take on debt. 
Versluysen (1999) states that, the aged and totally indigent should not belong to microfinance 
programs, because they would not be able to use the loan productively, and would be 
burdened with debt. According to the World Bank (2011), chronically poor, refugees and 
destitute people without regular income, should be rather provided with other forms of 
assistance than microfinance, such as access to food and clean water, housing, and income-
generating activities. The sick and mentally ill are also not good candidates for microfinancial 
services, as it is recognized that affected are less able to benefit from credit over time. 
Populations living in cultures that forbid conventional interest rate  or in totalitarian regimes 
not permitting free market practices hardly belong to potential microfinance market.  
Considering all obstacles in successful provision of microfinance services to the poor, 
the potential microfinance market is likely to be smaller than estimated in shallow, frequently 
repeating market guesses. The aim of this paper is thus to briefly examine and quantify 
different market segments excluded from the real demand and on the basis of available FAI 
statistics of number of adults without access to financial services try to define how big is the 
microfinance market wrongly considered as part of the global demand, concluding the real 
size of world’s microfinance market.   
  
 
2.  CURRENT ESTIMATES OF THE GLOBAL MICROFINANCE MARKET  
 
As there are many definitions of microfinance, the authors employ a definition used by 
MixMarket (2010), defining microfinance services as retail financial services that are 
relatively small in relation to the income of a typical individual, overlapping with another 
definition, identifying microfinance as credit, savings and other essential financial services 
within the reach of millions of people who are too poor to be served by regular banks, because 
they are unable to offer sufficient collateral (van Maanen, Oikocredit, 2004). The authors 
believe these definitions correspond to the general understanding of the concept of 
microfinance used by the mentioned sources, yet also should be complemented with the 
notion of sustainability, as long term microfinance operations cannot function on 
unsustainable basis. 
The popular yet deceptive estimates of the size of the microfinance market potential, 
highlighted by this study as misguided, differ across the whole spectrum of  players and reach 
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up to  almost a half of the total number of adults in developing countries, which is estimated 
at 3.75 billion (Kendall et al., World Bank, 2010), provided the MFIs do not accept under 
aged as clients. 
Bernhardt estimates the total market for microfinance at unattended 1.5 billion people 
(GC Capitalideas, 2009). The same number of 1.5 billion people was quoted by McKinsey & 
Company during the Microfinance Investor Roundtable in Washington DC in 2006 (Swibel, 
Forbes, 2008). Swanson estimates the total market potential of 1.5 billion clients (DW 
Markets, 2007). Lyman et al. (CGAP and IFC, 2011) estimate the number of potential 
microfinance clients at 2.7 billion adults worldwide, regarding also all those who do not have 
a savings or credit account in their name with a bank or other formal institution as potential 
clients. International association of microfinance investors estimate that an additional US$270 
billion is needed to provide financial services to the world’s 1.5 billion working poor (Trant, 
IAMFI, 2010). According to PlanetFinance estimates over 500 million entrepreneurs remain 
excluded from financial services.(Planet Finance, 2010) 1.8 billion of people experienced 
unmet demand for credit services (Robinson, 2001), while 2.5 billion people do not use 
financial services at all (Chaia et al, 2009).    
Seen from the point of view of the volume of capital needed, which seem to be centered 
around USD 300 bn. Swanson estimates  the total commercial market of more than US$ 250 
billion. (DW Markets, 2007) Unmet demand was estimated by Unitus in 2006 at 90 % of 
eligible self-employed lacking access to microfinance programs, reaching US$ 720  million 
USD. Blue Orchard estimated in 2004 that there were  500 million households requiring 
access to micro-financial services, arriving at a worldwide demand of  US$ 100 billion 
(Brugger and Duggal, 2004). Microcapital  estimated 4 % of the overall global demand for 
microfinance services is being met, valuing the potential global microfinance market to be 
worth  US$ 300 billion, which brings the total number of clients when using the average 
microloan size. Research department of Deutsche Bank in 2007 considered the funding gap of 
around USD 250 bn. PH&N Investment service equally considered microfinance institutions’ 
financial needs estimated to be US$ 300 billion across all funding sources in 2013. 
The average loan size differs importantly due to provision source, region as well as 
estimates and moreover, does not have a representative value for the total estimate of 
microfinance clientele, due to lack of vinculation with savings services as well as a sufficient 
lack of clarity due insufficient information base on the average microloan size. Microfinance 
NGO credits are approximately less than a quarter the size of the average loan provided by a 
microfinance bank (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt and Morduch, 2009a). Moreover, NGOs more often 
operate in rural areas and use group lending rather than individual types of contracts with an 
average loan size of USD 315.  (DB Research, 2013) Furthermore, MFIs often advertize 
average loan size as an important indicator pertaining outreach, and as a reinforcing signal for 
their main mission. (Armendáriz, 2009) Also, the average size of a microfinance loan was $ 
522.8 globally in 2010, according to MIX Market data, whereas the average loan size in India 
is only about a fourth of that at $ 144. (Crisil, 2010)  Mix Market, the frequent source of the 
estimates, however reunites data of greater, more formalized MFIs, interested and capable of 
international presentation, leaving a wide spectrum of especially rural institutions or local 
institutions uninterested in Mix Market participation.  
There are many of other financial institutions and intermediaries that include some 
significant proportion of poor and low-income people among their clientele, including 
government agricultural and development banks, postal and other savings banks, savings and 
loan cooperatives, and rural banks and that go on uncaptured (Rosenberg CGAP, 2008).   The 
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database captures only a small fraction of these other institutions and morever,  the Mix 
market database contains relatively little information about the savings services of the 
participating institutions.   
If we use the average microloan size of 522 USD in 2010, we arrive at the number of 
574 millions of microcredit clients.  
Concluding, the market estimates vary significantly between 300 million and 2,700 
million clients. Frequently is cited the potential market estimate of 1.5 billion people, which 
we take as the benchmark under review of this study, due to its frequency in mainstream 
literature as well as affinity to the average market estimate cited.The study considers the sum 
to be misleading and postulates the need to reduce it to more realistic statement.   
 
 
3.  SIZE AND STRUCTURE OF THE GLOBAL MICROFINANCE ANTIMARKET 
 
To be able to assess the approximate size of the unattainable market we focus on 
quantifiable market segments that cannot be served sustainably by MFIs, on population that is 
unable to service debt or that can be hurt by microfinance mechanics. These markets should 
not be counted into potential market estimates. The authors use therefore the concept of  
“Microfinance Antimarket” as a space unsuited for microfinance, yet wrongly included in the 
current estimates. The Microfinance Antimarket is formed by two types of clientele: clients of 
type A who are found in any market disregarding its geographic location and clients of type 
B, living in specific regions. 
Microfinance services without microcredit as their natural element are incomplete from 
the point of view of sustainability. The Antimarket A clients are thus considered persons 
unsuited for debt in form of microcredit, such as people too poor, ill or disabled who are 
incapable to use loans osustainably in the long term lacking the steady repayment income 
flow or people who simply don’t want microloans, lack creditworthiness or are incapable of 
periodic saving. The available microfinance delivery systems can’t thus lend to them without 
incurring unsustainable default levels. Also, many clients who qualify for loans are not 
necessarily borrowing all the time. To Antimarket B clients belong those living in regions 
stricken by wars and conflicts, cultures that are clearly unsuitable for microfinance provision, 
markets with predominant religious practices that do not permit use of classic style of 
microfinance.   
 
3. 1. Clientele that cannot qualify  
Not all of the potential microfinance clients qualify for savings or for a loan. The 
biggest excluded group inapt for loan mechanics, consists of people who do not have an 
income large or reliable enough to meet a loan’s payments. The very poor can be described as 
heterogeneous group of people experiencing deprivations, in particular being displaced 
people, migrant, ethnic or indigenous minorities, and usually living in remote areas or 
difficult environments with seasonally flooded or eroded areas (Hulme et al., 2007). 
In the study from Indonesia, focused on microfinance provided to extremely poor, 40 % 
of the households were deemed creditworthy (Johnston and Morduch 2007). MFIs rarely 
serve very poor people at the bottom of the poverty scale. There are substantial numbers of 
people who are not served and there is a debate about whether microfinance is actually 
suitable for the really poorest. (Hashemi and Rosenberg, CGAP, 2006). Hulme and Mosley 
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(1996) in their study reach a conclusion that “microloans are more beneficial to borrowers 
living above the poverty line than to borrowers living below the poverty line”. Most MFIs 
prefer to target the “upper poor” than the “very poor” in order to achieve sustainability, and 
the very poor are thus not being served by MFIs unless their programs are intentionally 
designed to reach them (Hickson, 1999). Rasmussen et al. (2005) estimate that 10 % of 
households in Bangladesh are too poor to be able to benefit from the microfinance and 
suggest that other services like grants and savings may be more suitable for these people. 
Other reason why the extremely poor do not participate in microfinance services may be 
because they are worried about the consequences of not being able to repay the loan back 
(Hashemi and Rosenberg, CGAP, 2006). For the poorest the opportunities for productive use 
of loans are usually limited, because the weekly meetings are too time-consuming and risk of 
default is very high (Wright and Dondo, 2001). The assumption that mutual solidarity will 
ensure that the successful members will cover for the defaulters increases the likelihood that 
the poorer will be considered not sufficiently reliable and will be rejected by the group 
(Gobezie, 2004).           
Vijay Mahajan, the chief executive of Basix, an Indian rural MFI, concludes that 
microfinance“seems to do more harm than good to the poorest, as those poor who cannot earn 
a greater return on their investment than the interest they must pay, they will become poorer 
as a result of microcredit, not wealthier.” (Karnani, 2007). 
For example, in Bangladesh, where most of the MFIs are focused on the very poor and 
microfinance environment is friendly, the poorest communities do not participate in 
microfinance programs and concentration of MFIs is highest among the second poorest 
quintile group and lowest among the poorest quintile (Zaman, World Bank, 2005). Based on 
the Nawaz study from Comilla district (2004) more than 65 % of the households, mainly from 
the bottom layer of extremely poor households, were not reached by three main MFIs 
operating in the area, in particular by Grameen Bank and ASA.  
Studies suggest the poorest seldom benefit from microfinance, while the middle and 
upper poor benefit the most and the poorest, 10 - 15 % of the population, are largely excluded 
from microfinance programs. As per experience of the first author of the paper made in a 
variety of several Mexican MFIs during a period 2006-2012, the unreached percentage 
continues to grow due to stricter credit analysis criteria caused by rising overindebtedness. 
(Hes, 2012). Microfinance institutions’ apparent “failure” to reach the poor may not be a 
failure at all, “but rather, a realization that microfinance is not the way out of poverty for all 
the poor.” (Zaman, 1997). Hulme and Mosley (1996) surveyed “successful” microfinance 
programs in seven different countries. In all microfinance programs, the average earnings of 
borrowers increased, however, borrowers below the poverty line actually had lower incomes 
than before joining the programs. They assumed that the better-off borrowers tend to invest in 
riskier and more productive ventures, including technological improvements and concluded 
that “while credit may be an effective vehicle for boosting the incomes of the poor, it may be 
counter-productive, in helping the poorest of the poor raise their living standards and 
alternative poverty reduction mechanisms are probably advisable for this group.” 
According to the findings from 15 studies conducted in Sub-Saharan Africa elaborated 
in Policy Brief in 2010 by Stewart et al., microfinance clients were made poorer, and not 
richer, by microfinance. This seems to be especially because they consume more than  invest 
in the future and their businesses fail to produce enough profit to pay high interest rates. The 
emphasis on reaching the poorest of the poor thus may be flawed and microsavings may be a 
better tool to alleviate poverty than microcredit. Pollin (2007) puts this view in the following 
22 Volume 2
  
words: “Micro enterprises run by poor people cannot be broadly successful simply because 
they have increased opportunities to borrow money. For large numbers of microenterprises to 
be successful, they also need infrastructure and marketing support to reach customers”. 
 Savings services for the poorest follow similar path as loan services. Behavioral 
explanations for the difficulty of saving focus on those who wish to but prove unable to save. 
(Atkinson et a., 2012) Self-control problems arise for reasons such as hyperbolic discounting 
(Laibson, 1997), intra-household disagreements (Ashraf et al., 2010), temptation goods 
(Banerjee and Mullainathan, 2009), or procrastination (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2001). The 
issue of forced savings mobilisation  may increase poverty and observations show that forced 
savings mobilisation, although meant to instigate a culture of saving discipline, does not 
match the realities of socio-economic situation of the poorest of the poor (Pitamber, 2003). 
On the other hand program developed by BRAC in Bangladesh has reached in the past 5 
years 300,000 extremely poor households and suceeded to lift 75 % of these over food 
security level and into management of sustainable economic activities, thus lifting them into 
microfinance target market (CGAP, 2012). The strategy is being replicated by the CGAP-
Ford Foundation Graduation Program and is likely to change the negative paradigm on link 
betweeen extreme poverty and microfinance.   
Drawing the line between the undernourished people who cannot even resolve basic 
nutrition needs and extreme poverty, 243 million adults in developing countries who are 
severely undernourished, judged by a body mass index of less than 17 kg/m2, can be 
considered too poor and disqualified from microfinance market (Kent, FAO, 2002). The 
potential market of 2.5 billion unbanked adults as per latest Financial Accesss initiative 
estimate is thus naturally reduced by 243 million of Antimarket type A non-clients.  
 
3. 2. Market not interested in microfinance  
Not all potential savers are interested in savings, being currently the most important 
service in microfinance sector, as per number of clients. These uninterested clients should not 
be included into realistically taylored microfinance market estimates. We logically assume  
that relative part of population in developing countries will not surpass the level of saving 
population in high income economies in foreseeable future, due to a variety of factors, 
financial literacy being the key one. Currently only 45 percent of adults in high-income 
economies report having saved at a bank, credit union, or microfinance institution in the past 
12 months (World Bank, 2012).  
A large part of  the maginalized populations that can earn a financial income may signal 
a latent demand for financial services in  general, but not for microcredit. (DB Research, 
2012) Many poor simply are not want active as enterpreneurs and wide part of the poplation 
would prefer to be employed than to take up risks of enterpreneurship. And those, who 
already run a business, can be reluctant to enter into debtorship status by taking on creditors 
capital. Thus, the latent demand for microcredit seems to be limited and the actual gap in 
serving the poor is much smaller than the estimates (DB Research, 2012). 
Many poor clients don’t have a use for microloans, even if they qualify for them, are 
reluctant to accept a repayment schedule or finance their investments through other informal 
means, lacking the skills, vision, creativity, and persistence to be entrepreneurial. As cited in 
Chanana (2007), “even in developed countries with high levels of education and access to 
financial services, about 90 % of the labor force is employees, not entrepreneurs”. 
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In 2002, microlending officers from Bank Rakyat Indonesia interviewed 1.438 
households chosen at random in 72 villages throughout six provinces, and less than 25 % had 
borrowed from any formal microlender in the past 3.5 years, despite proximity to such a 
provider (Johnston and Morduch, 2007). A survey of 17,000 microenterprises in Ecuador 
found that only about a half did apply for credit because they either did not want to be 
indebted (37 %) or did not need a loan (14 %), in spite of major expansion in microfinance 
loans in the country (Magill and Meyer 2005). One of the more interesting findings of the 
study was that 50 % of those who had not applied for a loan during the past years did not want 
loans under any terms. Navajas and Tejerina (2006) reviewed surveys of microbusinesses in 
Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, and the Dominican Republic, and concluded that 
only 20 % of people had applied for a loan. Karlan’s research reported the share of people 
who accepted the loan offer between 5 and 15 % in Peru, Mexico, Ghana, Morocco, the 
Philippines, and India (Anand and Rosenberg, 2008). 
Reports of total market penetration in Bangladesh paint a different picture. Between 
2003 and 2004, MFIs and government microfinance programs in Bangladesh reported 23.8 
million members, but only two-thirds were active borrowers. In the “Big Four” MFIs - 
Grameen, BRAC, ASA, and Proshika, 80 % of their clients had an active loan. In the other 
NGOs surveyed, around 65 % of the members had an active loan (Rasmussen et al., 2005). 
These numbers suggest that a significant reduction should be made of the expectations related 
to volume as well as numbers of available clients.  
The 2006 World Bank study estimated that microfinance reached 62 % of poor families 
in Bangladesh, with a mature microfinance market, while in countries like Bolivia and 
Indonesia fall far below the penetration levels reported in Bangladesh, despite difficult 
comparability of the mentioned markets. On balance, most microfinance demand estimates 
are probably overstated, sometimes by wide margins (Anand and Rosenberg, 2008). 
CGAP assumes that most current demand estimates expect that at least half of the target 
population would be borrowing at any given time if microcredit were available in their areas 
(Ibid, 2010). Based on the numbers stated in the available studies, we thus consider that at 
least 50 % of the most optimistic potential target population, which is derived from the 
number of unbanked adults estimated by FAI at 2,500 million comes to 1,250 million adults 
in developing countries, would be not interested in a microloan, adding  next 625 million non-
clients to Antimarket type A and B. As to savings, when we apply the benchmark of high 
income countries, with only 45 % of people saving on periodic basis in developed world, the 
realistic market estimate of those not targetable as interested savings clients. is similar to 
previous estimate, 1.125 million of people.  
 
3. 3. Sick clientele  
An important part of the population in developing countries is unacceptable as 
microfinance clientele, due to incapacity to service debts or related high risks. Into major 
categories for such types of clientele can be considered ill, disabled and mentally ill. 
The three most devastating diseases: HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria together, 
these “Big Three” account for the loss or incapacity of  76.864 million1 potential clients 
(Hotez et al., 2006). As stated by (Roenne and Wagner, GIZ, 2005) targeting HIV positive 
clientele threatens not only the financial sustainability of MFIs, as the ability of affected 
                                                          
1 Number calculated by authors based on data from (Aids.org, 2000), (Avert, 2010), 
(Gatesfoundantion, 2009), (WHO, 2012), (WHO, 2010a) and (WHO, 2010b). 
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families to pay back their arrears diminishes and the proportion of productive clients declines, 
but may even further harm the household’s economic position. Provision of microfinance in 
areas where illness such as HIV/AIDS pervades can be troubled by such developments as 
entire loan groups dying, loans going into default, or borrowers being forced to use 
compulsory savings for health expenses (Caldas et al., 2010). Most practitioners thus agree 
that the most important role of MFIs is to continue to serve only those who can make use of 
financial resources (Parker et al. 2010). 
Although few successful examples of microfinance programs for PLWHA were 
described in the literature, MFIs usually recognize the special challenges of minimizing risk 
of loan default and do not target microfinance to a single type of high-risk client. 
As an example serves the case of URWEGO, a leading microfinance bank operating in 
post-conflict Rwanda. URWEGO provided microfinance to poor women whose husbands had 
died of HIV/AIDS. Most of them were also HIV positive, and reached the symptomatic stage 
within a few months after joining the program. As a few borrowers fell sick, stopped 
attending meetings and failed to repay, the other members of the group stopped paying also 
and the entire scheme quickly collapsed (Parker and Pearce, CGAP, 2002). 
Another example can be found in Kenya, where Women fighting AIDS in Kenya 
(WOFAK), an AIDS support national NGO, tried to raise and sell vegetables to secure a 
source of income, but discover that no one would buy their vegetables because of the stigma 
associated with HIV/AIDS. The explicit targeting to PLWHA has resulted in negative 
outcomes (Donahue, 2000). 
If only considering the severely ill through three most widespread diseases, disregarding 
the number of victims of other illnesses or impaired ones, we arrive at number of other 76.9 
million people incapable of becoming microfinance clients, belonging to Antimarket type A. 
 
3. 4. Displaced people  
People without firm presence in their local markets are naturally excluded from 
microfinance dynamics, which focuses on financing of microenterpreneurs well integrated in 
the tissue of their local markets.  
As per 2010 UNHCR Global Trends report, 43.7 million people were displaced 
worldwide. Of these, 15.4 million were refugees - 10.55 million under UNHCR’s mandate 
and 4.82 million Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA. Within this total were also 
27.5 million internally displaced persons within their own country by conflict and 837,500 
asylum-seekers. 
 
3. 5. Culture and religious reasons  
44 % of world’s microfinance clients currently live in Muslim majority countries 
claimed CGAP in 2011. The Shariah-compliant micro loans, acceptable for the mentioned 
populations, albeit expanding rapidly make up less than 1 per cent of the industry typically 
use the murabahah concept, in which the financing party purchases assets for the client and 
sells them at a predetermined profit margin (Khan, 2011; Permatasari, 2010). The 
conventional microfinance  scheme is however unacceptable in shariah-compliant market due 
to riba2 on loans, due to riba on savings as well as maysir3 on insurance, basically forbidding 
                                                          
2 Concept of interest prohibition in Islam 
3 Concept of gambling or speculation prohibited by Islamic Law. 
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these concepts, rendering microfinance an incompatible financial mechanism with Shariah-
compliant finance.  
Despite size of market, the demand can be met only if low income clients are convinced 
about the authentic Islamic nature of the product which is not the case at present (CGAP, 
2008). The currently used Murabaha concept harbours several legal as well as religious 
obstacles which render the Islamic market limited, despite attempts of religious leaders, 
scholars and practitioners to find way forward.  
Surveys conducted in Jordan, Algeria, and Syria revealed that between 20 - 40 % of 
respondents consider religious reasons as the main obstacle for obtaining conventional 
microfinance (Karim et. al, CGAP, 2008). Particularly, in Jordan 32 %, in Algeria 20.7 % and 
in Syria 43 % of the potential clients surveyed cited religious reasons for not accessing 
microfinance.  
In addition, 46 % of Syrian respondents who had never applied for a loan stated that 
religious reasons were the primary reason they had never applied and about 5 % of current 
borrowers who had already applied said they would not apply for a loan for religious reasons 
(IFC, 2007). Not only those who do not use microfinancial services, but also active clients are 
influenced by cultural and religious bias. Such influence came out of a field study carried out 
in Ankara by team of students of Czech University of Life Sciences in 2012, evidencing that 
8.5 % of the microcredit holders are pressurized by their religious to leaders to quit the use of 
conventional microfinance.   
If we consider populations living under Sharia Islamic Law4, which practically bans the 
conventional microfinance due to existence of interest, whether in form of loan, deposit, or 
fixed return for the investor, we come to the number of 155.5 million adults5 that may not be 
integrated within the present microfinance market expectations.  
 
3. 6. Totalitarian regimes and conflict ridden regions   
The environment has a significant effect upon the establishment and succesfull 
execution of microfinance services and security is the most important factor for sustainable 
MFIs. Post-conflict environment is not compatible with the normal context for successful 
microfinance operations, as one of the pre-conditions for microfinance include the absence of 
violent conflict, and a reasonably “rooted”  population (FindArticles, 2009).  
 Also generous relief grants, provided in post-crisis areas can have a negative effects on 
microfinance during decades of peace, as the relief interventions can damage future of 
development. If we consider totalitarian states such as Cuba and North Korea, and add 
Somalia, top country listed on failed states index6 and consider their adult population as unfit 
for conventional microfinance operations due to extreme insecurity or simply microfinance 
operations forbidden by the state, we arrive to the conservative conclusion that 30.1 million7 
people should not belong to the global market estimates.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 Iran, Libya, Nigeria, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Yemen. 
5 Number calculated by authors based on data from (CIA, 2012). 
6 Number calculated by authors based on data from (CIA, 2012). 
7 Number calculated by authors based on data from (CIA, 2012). 
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4.  SUMMARIZING ESTIMATE OF THE UNATTENDED GLOBAL 
     MICROFINANCE SECTOR   
  
The following estimate of the unattainable global microfinance sector is derived from 
the obvious segments of the clientele, that cannot be served and should not be included in the 
current simplistic assumptions of the total market potential.  
Our estimate is imperfect due to potential overlapping of characteristics of mentioned 
groups as well as because of incongruency between microfinance and microcredit concepts, 
but this issue can be offset by many other parameters that were not included in the study, such 
as role of sex within the context of microfinance products focused predominantly on women. 
 Also, if we consider other additional, not quantified factors such as social exclusion and 
discrimination of people with impairments and their families, regulatory incursions of states 
that can delete potentials of local markets or natural hazards, which in some regions eliminate 
feasibility of microfinance as a sustainable sector in the long term, we arrive to the outcome 
that our estimate is acceptable and conservative. After summing up groups of clients that 
should not be included within the total market assumptions as per Table 1 and detracting from 
the latest FAI estimate of population without any access to financial services, we come to the 
conclusion that there is at least 524,5 million people wrongly assumed to be part of total 
microfinance demand.  
The real potential market is thus reduced to 975.4 million of unattended and valid client 
for sustainable microfinance. 
 
Table 1. Total reduced microfinance market. 
Antimarket AUnqualifiable clients = 243 million 
Antimarket ADisease = 76.9 million 
Antimarket BDisplaced = 43.7 million 
Antimarket BReligion = 155.5 million 
Antimarket BTotalitarian = 30.1 million 
Antimarket Total ANI = 549.2 million 
Market w/o access to finance FAI estimate = 2 500 million 
Market corrected full estimate (FAI est. -Antimarket) = 1950,8 million 
Antimarket ANot interested clients = 975,4 million 
MarketTotal realistic estimate = 975,4 million 
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5.  IMPLICATIONS OF DISTORTED VISION OF MICROFINANCE MARKET 
     POTENTIAL 
 
Exaggerated notion of vastness of available markets as well as extent of unattended 
human needs is a cause for synergetic variety of detrimental processes. It fuels proliferation of  
capital, which does not aim at proper targets of microfinance as a tool of fight against poverty, 
as it mistakenly views in microfinance a panacea for more that it can accomplish, leading to 
superficial placement.  
Another problem is an oversupply of uncritically conceded capital funding induced by 
sources driven by pressures of aroused public opinion, luring MFIs into rapid growth, which 
either exceeds the debt burden the clients can manage or destabilizes the market due to 
incapacity of the institutional debtors to manage the capital and going bankrupt. As no 
international black list, nor reliable data on MFI bankruptcies and loan defaults is disponible, 
despite periodically ocurring mishappenings, successful MFIs receive a lot of attention, while 
there is no public analysis  of bankruptcies, hypocritically treated as a non-existing and shun 
away from the spot light.  
Although defended with a development rhetoric, great part of support for microfinance 
seems to be based on simple but superficial poverty relief; it gets some resources to the poor 
(Practical Action, 2012).    
Noxious long term implication of the overstatement is a gradual cementation of a myth 
of microfinance as a mainstream sustainable development  product, suited for any conditions 
in any project due to bankability of most people, instead of building up the vision of 
microfinance as a niche instrument which needs to be operated with care,  prudence and 
understanding of local complexities. 
 
 
6.  CONCLUSION  
 
The estimates of total microfinance demand are based upon simplistic assumptions  
putting equal sign between the number of unbanked adults living in developing regions and 
estimated microfinance clientele, disregarding whole variety of factors in the expectation that 
most qualifying people in productive age can be considered clients. Once considered and 
taken into account limitations of the market, these clearly reduce the global potential of 
microfinance to a fraction of widely used numbers. Eventhough some approximation is 
needed due to imppsibility of an exact estimate, according to the authors, the numbers 
involved in literature are widely misguiding.  
The study defined several areas, where the inclusion of clientele as a microfinance 
target market can be considered a misguidance. As such could be included portion of clientele 
that cannot qualify for a loan, ill and sick clientele, displaced ones, culturally inapt 
populations to take up loans or people living in totalitarian regimes of conflict ridden regions. 
Unqualifiable clients who are found in any market disregarding its geographic location sum 
up at least 320 millions and clients of type B, living in specific regions exceed 229 millions. 
When these numbers are added the sum of qualified clients who are expected simply not 
to be interested in microfinance, independently on their capacity to become such which varies 
around half of billion people out of the total of the estimated market, the study arrives to a 
gross number of almost half a billion wrongly assumed to be part of a potential microfinance 
market. This detection of deep diference contrasting with common estimates leads us to an 
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alerting finding that numbers used in common reasonings related to microfinance potential are 
exaggerated and should be thus discarded as mainstream development propaganda, 
uncritically using shallow information not founded on realistic assumptions nor subjected to 
consequent considerations.  
Despite the limitation of this paper due to no distinction between sustainable MFIs and 
non-profit MFIs driven by social goals, where sustainability is not key target, the use of basic 
logics leads us to propose diminution of the global view of this market as a more undersized 
space for development and for microfinance impact, when compared to the common 
expectations. Microfinance, as a tool of development, seen in this light of critical view, not 
open or advisable for a major part of human population due to to multiple requirements of 
different nature related to peculiarities of handling with finance , stays an important 
instrument in the fight against poverty, however on a more limited scale than so often cited or 
proclaimed by development practitioners.   
   
List of abbreviations 
FAI  Financial Access Initiative 
MFI   Microfinance Institution  
MIV   Microfinance Investment Vehicle  
NGO   Non-governmental organization  
PLWHA  People Living With HIV/AIDS 
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